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ABSTRACT
We investigate a sample of 50 firm-events, identified in the Global Research
Analysts Settlement, in which analysts were discovered to have acted mislead-
ingly ex post. In this setting, analysts’ incentives caused them to issue public
disclosures that differed from their private beliefs. We document that these
firms’ institutional holdings decline significantly during the period in which
the analysts issued misleading disclosures. During this period daily small-size
trades (a proxy for individual investors) are dominated by buy orders while
daily large-size trades (a proxy for institutional investors) are dominated by
sell orders. Short interest increases during the event period, consistent with
the idea that sophisticated investors are selling. Our estimates of investors’
trading losses show that individual investors lost about two and a half times
the amount lost by institutions. Overall, the results suggest a wealth transfer
from individuals to institutions that is likely attributable to analysts’ misleading
behavior.
1. Introduction
Economic theory predicts that sell-side analysts act strategically and in
their best interests. In some cases, this strategic behavior results in analysts
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rationally issuing public disclosures to investors that differ from the ana-
lysts’ beliefs. It is difficult, however, for researchers to identify the strategic
behavior of analysts empirically because analysts’ beliefs are private. Our
study takes advantage of the Global Research Analyst Settlement (Settlement)
to identify a “clean” set of firm-events in which analysts issued misleading
stock research. We use this sample to test whether analysts’ misleading be-
havior leads to a wealth transfer from individual investors to institutional
investors (hereafter, “individuals” and “institutions,” respectively).
In formal complaints, the SEC documents how analysts from 11 promi-
nent Wall Street investment banks (sanctioned banks) provided misleading
information to investors over the period April 1999 to July 2002, allegedly
because of investment banking incentives.1 A large part of the evidence
consists of analysts’ private communications recorded in emails. In some
instances, analysts communicated positive public information that was in-
consistent with their private negative views about the stocks. In other cases,
analysts made exaggerated or unwarranted claims or failed to publicly dis-
close to investors fees received in exchange for publishing research. We
draw our sample of 50 firm-events directly from the Settlement. We docu-
ment that individuals adjust their holdings differently from institutions for
poorly performing stocks in which analysts act misleadingly, resulting in a
wealth transfer. We highlight that our inferences are unaffected by regu-
lators’ selection criteria because these firm-events were chosen for reasons
unrelated to the wealth transfer we document. A summary of our tests and
findings follows.
First, we predict and find that for Settlement firms, institutional share
holdings, measured using their Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
13F filings, decreased over the event period, implying that institutions were
selling these stocks. The decline is attributable mainly to decreases in the
number of institutions holding the stock rather than to decreases in the own-
ership per institution. This is consistent with analysts disclosing their private
information to select client institutions. Second, we investigate trading be-
havior using detailed New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) trade and quote
(TAQ) information. We use trade size to determine whether the trade was
initiated by institutions or individuals and the Lee and Ready [1991] algo-
rithm to classify trades as buyer- or seller-initiated orders. “Net buy” is the
difference between buyer- and seller-initiated trades. We find that individ-
uals net buy relatively more shares than institutions over the event period,
consistent with the institutional ownership results. Third, we use the TAQ-
based trading measures in conjunction with actual stock returns to calculate
the economic consequences of the different trading behaviors of individ-
uals and institutions. Although institutions are involved in the bulk of the
trading, we find that individuals lose $2.2 billion, an amount that is ap-
proximately two and a half times the amount that institutions lose. While
1 The SEC complaints can be found at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalsettlement.htm.
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the TAQ-based trading measures are a noisy proxy, these results corrobo-
rate the institutional-holdings analysis. Fourth, we show that short interest
increased during the event period. This result suggests that sophisticated
investors, broadly defined to include hedge funds, sell ahead of the stock
price declines and benefit over the event period. Because these short sell-
ers do not typically file 13Fs, our institutional-ownership tests (which are
based on 13F holding changes) understate the negative effect of analysts’
misleading behavior on individuals.
We also conduct our tests on selected subsamples. Our results are gener-
ally stronger when there is evidence that analysts tipped off selected insti-
tutions, when sanctioned banks have larger numbers of individual investor
clients, when firms have fewer analysts issuing recommendations, and when
firms are larger. Our results are robust to comparisons with those for con-
trol firms that are matched on exchange listing, size, industry, and analyst
consensus recommendation levels, and to the use of various fixed-length
event windows. Overall, our findings show that institutions lose less than
individuals during the event period, consistent with analysts’ misleading
disclosures causing a wealth transfer from individuals to institutions. Our
evidence is less consistent with other scenarios, such as institutions placing
less weight on analyst opinions or institutions unraveling analyst bias better
than individuals.
We make two contributions. First, our study provides a direct test of
whether analysts’ misleading behavior harms investors, thereby contribut-
ing to the growing literature on explanations for the differential investment
performance of investor classes, such as institutions and individuals. In
other work, Iskoz [2003], Malmendier and Shanthikumar [2004, 2005],
and Mikhail, Walther, and Willis [2005] study the effect of recommenda-
tions on the trading behavior of individuals and institutions. They provide
mixed evidence on whether individuals suffer trading losses by following
the recommendations of analysts who issue positive public recommenda-
tions and analysts employed by investment banks who issue firm’s securities.
While the effect of recommendations is interesting in its own right, these
studies cannot distinguish between whether analysts behave strategically or
whether they simply have overly optimistic views of the stock. Our sample
only includes confirmed situations in which analysts behave strategically.
Also, these other studies assume constant short (e.g., three- or five-day) or
long (e.g., one-year) windows, which are not exogenous because analysts
choose when to issue recommendations. We use medium-sized event peri-
ods exogenously defined by the Settlement. Neither the analysts engaging
in the misleading behavior nor the investors who were trading during the
event period knew that formal investigations would take place.
Second, our results provide support for recent regulation that has
changed the incentives of analysts. For example, as part of the Settle-
ment, sanctioned banks agreed to sever links between research and invest-
ment banking (SEC [2003a]). To the extent that these regulatory changes
have significantly reduced, or eliminated, situations in which analysts act
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misleadingly, the plight of individuals has improved. Addressing these is-
sues is consistent with the aims of regulators and lawmakers to protect all
investors. Our results complement other research on recent analyst reg-
ulation. Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman [2006] document that investment
bank buy recommendations, particularly those issued by investment banks
involved in the Settlement, on average underperform the buy recommen-
dations of independent research firms. Barber et al. [2006] show that part
of the decrease in the percentage of buy recommendations is a result of the
analyst regulation. Further, Kadan et al. [2005] find that after the adoption
of the regulation the probability of receiving an optimistic recommendation
no longer depends on whether the analyst is affiliated.
Section 2 discusses prior research and motivates our research question.
Section 3 provides institutional background on the Settlement and describes
our sample. We then document how institutional investors respond to ana-
lysts’ misleading behavior using institutional holdings (section 4) and TAQ
data (section 5), respectively. In section 6, we document the wealth transfer
from actively trading individuals to institutions during the event period. The
examination of changes in short interest is presented in section 7. Section 8
provides additional analyses, including controls for the effect of returns and
short sales, as well as the results of our tests on select subsamples. Section 9
provides some caveats of our analyses, as well as discusses how our findings
could generalize to other situations.
2. Literature Review and Research Question
A large body of research studies the differential investment behavior of
institutions and individuals. Most of these studies document a relation be-
tween categories of investors and stock returns (past, contemporaneous, and
future).2 Research that explains the relation between stock returns and in-
vestor trading behavior is more limited. Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho
[2002] show that institutional trading decisions are correlated with firms’
cash flow news. Barber and Odean [2006], Lee [1992], and Hirshleifer et al.
[2003] show that individuals buy when any type of news (negative or positive)
arrives. Malmendier and Shanthikumar [2004, 2005], Mikhail, Walther, and
Willis [2005], and He and Mian [2005] find that institutions and individuals,
2 Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny [1992], Nofsinger and Sias [1999], Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers [1995], Wermers [1999, 2000], Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers [2000], Grinblatt
and Keloharju [2001], Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu [2003], and others show that institu-
tional buying is correlated with past and contemporaneous stock returns. Odean [1998] and
Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu [2003] provide evidence that individual stock buying is corre-
lated negatively with past returns and correlated positively with contemporaneous returns. The
evidence that institutional (individual) buying is correlated positively (negatively) with short-
term expected returns or that institutions (individuals) produce superior (inferior) investment
performance is mixed (Jensen [1968], Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny [1992], Nofsinger and
Sias [1999], Odean [1999], Barber and Odean [2000], Wermers [2000], Gompers and Metrick
[2001], Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu [2003], Barber et al. [2005]).
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proxied by large- and small-size trades, respectively, react over three- to five-
day windows to analyst disclosures, and that their relative reaction depends
on the level, change, and type (recommendation or forecast) of disclosure.
Two papers directly link postanalyst information event-return performance
to investor types and analyst information. Malmendier and Shanthikumar
[2004] show that long-term returns following analyst recommendations are
negatively correlated with the buying behavior of individuals. In contrast,
Iskoz [2003] uses 13F institutional holdings data to measure trading be-
havior and asserts that individuals do not lose money by following analyst
advice.
None of these studies distinguish between analysts who strategically bias
their recommendations and analysts who simply have positive views. Some of
these studies partition analysts according to whether they work for affiliated
or unaffiliated investment banks. Affiliated analysts issue more optimistic
earnings growth forecasts and more favorable recommendations, and are
slower to downgrade in the face of negative news (Dugar and Nathan [1995],
Lin and McNichols [1998], Michaely and Womack [1999], Dechow, Hutton,
and Sloan [2000], O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin [2005]). As Kolasinski and
Kothari [2005] argue, however, affiliation does not necessarily measure
strategic behavior. Firms about to issue equity may simply select investment
banks with analysts who have truly positive views of the firm. Bradley, Jordan,
and Ritter [2006] argue further that affiliation could be negatively cor-
related with strategic behavior. Because affiliated analysts are more likely
to retain future investment-banking business, nonaffiliated analysts have
stronger incentives to add optimistic bias to “curry favor” with management.
Our sample relies on neither affiliation nor analyst recommendations to
proxy for strategic behavior.
We use this setting to test whether analysts’ misleading behavior leads to a
transfer of wealth from individuals to institutions. We consider institutions to
be more informed because they are more sophisticated, have access to larger
information sets, and spend more resources on the investment process than
individuals.3 We predict that institutions gain at the expense of individu-
als for three reasons. First, we expect that institutions place less weight on
signals from sell-side analysts so that analysts have a relatively smaller effect
on institutional trading. Even if the analyst signal is unadjusted for any po-
tential bias, institutional demand for the stock will deviate from the prior
optimal level by a relatively smaller amount than the individual demand.
Second, if institutions anticipate that individuals will follow analysts’ recom-
mendations to a greater extent, then institutions could take advantage of
any temporary trading-related pressure on prices caused by misinformed
individuals. Third, institutions could be better at unraveling the sell-side
3 See Bhushan [1989], Lo and Mackinlay [1990], Hand [1990], Lee [1992], Cornell and
Sirri [1992], Badrinath, Kale, and Noe [1995], Sias and Starks [1997], Walther [1997], Bonner,
Walther, and Young [2003], Battalio and Mendenhall [2005], and Callen, Hope, and Segal
[2005].
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analysts’ bias. Institutions could also receive less-biased information, and
hence trade based on analysts’ true view of the stock. Analysts have more
incentives to serve institutions than individuals because institutions manage
larger pools of funds, and hence trade more shares that increase brokerage
commissions. In addition, analysts routinely communicate with institutions
in less formal ways (such as by phone, by email, and in person), which pro-
vides analysts with an opportunity to directly or indirectly convey their true
views.
3. Institutional Background and Sample
3.1 THE SETTLEMENT
The Settlement was first announced on December 20, 2002 (SEC [2002])
and is the culmination of investigations of potential conflicts of interest in
equity research analysis by the New York (NY) Attorney General, U.S. SEC,
National Association of Security Dealers, NYSE, and state regulators. The
publicized civil charge was that affiliated analysts routinely issued overly op-
timistic disclosures to curry favor with corporate clients and to win lucrative
investment-banking business, and that in the process misled investors (SEC
[2003a, 2003b], Smith, Craig, and Solomon [2003]). As part of the Settle-
ment, 11 sanctioned banks agreed to provide $432.75 million to compensate
investors who purchased specific securities during a specific period defined
by the Settlement from a specific sanctioned bank.4 We describe below in
detail how our sample of sanctioned banks was selected and investigated.
Investigation into analysts’ conflicts of interest started with congressional
hearings in the summer of 2001. The office of the NY Attorney Gen-
eral started its investigation of Merrill Lynch at the same time (Gasparino
[2002a]).5 These investigations immediately followed the general collapse
in the stock prices of technology and telecommunication companies, sug-
gesting that investor losses were a major catalyst for the investigation. The
complete set of banks under investigation was first reported in the Wall Street
Journal on May 23, 2002. The 12 sanctioned banks include the 10 largest
banks in the U.S. ranked by capital according to The Securities Industry Year-
book (Securities Industry Association [2001]). The other two sanctioned
banks were mid-size brokerage houses specializing in technology equity of-
ferings. The NY Attorney General’s stated goal was to effect major structural
changes in the way Wall Street banks provide stock research to eliminate
investment-banking influences and to achieve a global resolution that the
industry would accept (Gasparino [2002b]). The focus on these 12 banks
4 The Settlement includes other penalties and structural reforms to resolve conflict of in-
terest issues at brokerage firms (see the link in footnote 1).
5 To clarify, Merrill Lynch is one of the 12 sanctioned banks as part of the Settlement. How-
ever, Merrill Lynch is not one of the 11 sanctioned banks in our sample because its agreement
did not include money allocated for investor restitution.
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was consistent with this goal because these banks conducted the majority of
telecommunications and technology equity offerings and so produced most
of the research by analysts who experienced investment-banking conflicts.
These banks were the industry leaders and hence a global resolution was
more likely if they all agreed. These banks attracted the most media attention
and hence investigators would benefit more politically by investigating these
firms. Consistent with Watts and Zimmerman [1986], regulators likely took
advantage of the bursting of the tech bubble to create a “crisis” which they
could then “solve” to gain political advantage. These banks generally had
the largest number of institutional and individual clients.6 Last, focusing on
a subset of banks was consistent with the significant costs of investigating
each bank.
The investigative process consisted of interviews with analysts and exec-
utives at the sanctioned banks and reviews of emails and other internal
documents (such as performance contracts). For example, five investigators
reviewed 30,000 emails related to Merrill Lynch’s Internet group (Gasparino
[2002c]) and state regulators investigating Goldman Sachs reviewed more
than 80,000 emails and other documents (Schroeder and Smith [2002]).
During the settlement process, the SEC publicized the details of the com-
plaint against each sanctioned bank (SEC [2003a, 2004]).
3.2 CLASSIFICATION OF MISLEADING ANALYST BEHAVIOR
The SEC announced the exact dates for the 53 selected stocks (some for
multiple time periods) for which investors who were clients of the sanc-
tioned banks would be eligible for compensation (SEC [2003b, 2004]). It
is during these dates that analysts allegedly engaged in misleading behav-
ior by communicating positive public information about the selected stocks
while the prices of these stocks were generally falling.7 The appendix lists
the sanctioned banks, the equity securities involved, and the start and end
dates of the eligible period—all as defined in the Settlement.8
6 These banks were unlikely to have been chosen solely because of the number of individual
clients. Many other brokerage houses had much larger numbers of individual clients. To ex-
amine the size of the individual investor client base, we reviewed the number of broker offices
per investment bank, a proxy for the number of individual-investor clients, as published in The
Securities Industry Yearbook (Securities Industry Association [2001]). Only 4 of the 12 sanctioned
banks are ranked in the top 10 in terms of broker offices.
7 In some cases, the negative returns were quite dramatic and led directly to bankruptcy. For
example, four of the Settlement firms went bankrupt and were delisted within three months
of the end of the event period. All our results are robust to the exclusion of these observations.
Untabulated analysis indicates that 46 of the 50 firm-events in the Settlement sample experi-
enced a decrease in their stock price over the SEC event period, although not all returns are
so dramatic.
8 In some cases, we can reconcile the chosen start and end dates of the Settlement with dates
specifically mentioned in the SEC complaint. For example, many of the start and end dates
correspond with the date of the email indicating that the analysts’ true views were negative and
the date of the downward recommendation revision, respectively. However, it is impossible to
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T A B L E 1
Descriptive Statistics on the Investor Restitution Part of the Global Research Analyst Settlement
This table presents descriptive statistics on the classification of analysts’ misleading behavior
and distribution of the event-period lengths. Panel A presents the frequency of each allegation
of misleading behavior as established in the final Settlement. Panel B presents the frequency
distribution of event-window lengths by the number of months.
Panel A: Classification of analysts’ misleading behavior
Frequency
Percentage of
Alleged Behavior Number Total
Fraud 4 8%
Exaggerated, unwarranted, or no reasonable basis 34 68%
Receiving payment for research coverage but no disclosure 8 16%
Other (failing to update) 4 8%
Disclosed selectively 16 32%
Panel B: Distribution of event-period lengths
Frequency
Event-Period Percentage of Cumulative
Length (Months) Number Total Percentage
1 3 6% 6%
2 4 8% 14%
3 24 48% 62%
4 3 6% 68%
5 1 2% 70%
6 3 6% 76%
7 6 12% 88%
8 1 2% 90%
9 1 2% 92%
>9 4 8% 100%
Each security is associated with a specific allegation made by the SEC.
Table 1, panel A tabulates the frequency of the allegations for the firms in
our sample. The most severe allegation is “Fraud,” in which analysts em-
ployed by the sanctioned banks were accused of publishing positive recom-
mendations that were contrary to their true negative opinions. The most
common allegation was of publishing reports that contained “exaggerated”
or “unwarranted” claims and/or contained opinions for which there was
“no reasonable basis.” Another similar allegation was that analysts failed to
keep recommendations current. The remaining allegation against the sanc-
tioned banks was that they received payments for providing research cover-
age for some firms but failed to disclose these fees to investors. These pay-
ments were from other investment banks who conducted the firm’s equity
offering.
reconcile the dates systematically. Investigators had access to much larger sets of information
and we assume that the start and end dates of the Settlement represent the periods in which
the research was misleading.
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Investigators identified 16 cases in which private “negative” signals were
sent to institutions via email, even though the official public recommenda-
tion was positive. These cases are a subset of those in which analysts were ac-
cused of issuing fraudulent reports or making exaggerated or unwarranted
claims. For example, the SEC complaint against Bear Stearns reports that
in an email discussing some bad news about CAIS Internet, Inc., “the an-
alyst stated: ‘Any other scoop on this piece of sh–?’” and a few days later
in response to an institutional investor query about CAIS fourth-quarter re-
sults, “the analyst stated: ‘It’s up a lot year to date . . . don’t overstay your wel-
come on this one.’” In another example, the SEC complaint against Lehman
Brothers Inc. reports that an analyst “wrote to an institutional investor, ‘if it’s
in my group it’s a short’ despite the fact that the analyst maintained 1-Strong
Buy ratings on all of his stocks.”
3.3 SETTLEMENT FIRMS SAMPLE
In general, analysts appear in the sample because they worked for the
sanctioned banks, covered investment-banking clients, and published al-
legedly misleading research.9 The analyst behaviors correspond to specific
stocks and periods. We rely on the start and end dates of the investor resti-
tution period for each stock, as listed in the Settlement, to define our set
of firm-event observations. Table 1, panel B shows the distribution of the
event-period lengths. These range from seven days up to 14 months.
Of the 58 firm-events (53 firms) in the Settlement, with one exception,
there is no overlap by security and time. Two brokers, Citigroup Global
Markets and Thomas Weisel Partners, settled for the same firm, Level 3
Communications Inc., for almost identical time periods. These two events
were combined into one observation. We exclude JDS Uniphase from our
sample because it merged with another firm during the event period. We
also exclude six other firms that had their initial public offering (IPO)
within one quarter of the event period because the initial trading be-
havior of IPO firms may not be stable.10 The final sample consists of 50
9 From reading the SEC complaints and reviewing actual investment-banking transactions
(using the SDC database), we confirmed that, except for one firm, there was some form of
investment-banking pressure placed on the analysts. For example, sanctioned banks partici-
pated in the IPOs and secondary offerings of 21 and 14 sample firms, respectively. In some
cases, the SEC complaints state that the firm is an investment-banking client without detailing
the relationship. Analysts also admit that their positive disclosures were motivated to increase
the chance of obtaining an investment-banking assignment. In other cases, sanctioned banks
were paid for research from the underwriting fees of specific firms but were not officially part
of the underwriting team.
10 Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri [2002] document that institutions dominate IPO allocations.
Field and Hanka [2001] find that, when lockup agreements (typically 180 days after IPOs)
expire, there is a permanent 40% increase in average trading volume and statistically significant
three-day negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, IPO shares could be allocated to executives
of firms unrelated to the IPO but who are clients of the investment bank that leads the IPO.
This practice is discussed in the SEC complaints against the sanctioned banks and is banned
as part of the Settlement.
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firm-events (46 firms). The appendix specifically indicates those firms ex-
cluded from our sample. Untabulated analysis indicates that almost all Set-
tlement firms are technology companies operating in communication, re-
search and development (R&D)-intensive, or Internet-related industries and
that the majority of these firms trade on NASDAQ (27), a small number on
NYSE (9), and the remaining trade over-the-counter (14).
We highlight three notable aspects of our Settlement sample. First, nei-
ther the analysts acting misleadingly nor the investors trading during the
event period knew that a formal investigation would take place. Thus, their
behavior is untainted by the formal investigations and eventual settlement.
While media articles and congressional hearings questioning analysts’ con-
flicts of interest occurred in the spring and summer of 2001 and could have
affected analyst behavior at this time, the likely effect would be to curtail the
misleading behavior and hence would work against our findings.
Second, an important question is whether analysts were caught, and hence
appear in our sample, because of the wealth transfers. Based on our analysis of
the choice of banks investigated, the details of published formal allegations
and the process that investigators followed, there is no evidence that investi-
gators quantified investor losses in general, or the losses of institutions and
individuals in particular, in any systematic way.11 For example, the actual
amounts for investor restitution in the Settlement are crude. Six sanctioned
banks each paid $25 million. This coarseness is inconsistent with conjectures
that investigators knew in advance the extent of investor losses, or whether
losing investors were more likely to be individuals. Hence, while the sample
could have been chosen for very specific reasons, (e.g., to maximize politi-
cal gain), these reasons are exogenous to our research question—the effect
of misleading analysts on wealth transfers. Thus, the selection should not
affect inferences.
Third, our tests measure the trading of all investors and do not measure
the specific trading of clients of the sanctioned banks (the only investors
eligible for compensation). Research by the sanctioned banks was dissemi-
nated broadly through outlets such as First Call, Investext, Bloomberg, and
the media (e.g., analysts were often interviewed on television). Other in-
vestors could have been influenced by the research (especially given the
status of these investment banks), but purchased the stock via another bro-
ker, such as a competing full-service brokerage firm or an online trading
entity.12 To the extent that only a subset of investors is affected by the mis-
leading behavior, the power of our tests is reduced.
11 We read all Wall Street Journal articles for the period January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2005
that were directly or remotely related to Wall Street analysts, research, conflicts of interest,
and the Settlement. This encompassed several hundred articles, which we believe provides
comprehensive coverage of the public details of these subjects.
12 As an example, Credit Suisse First Boston (a sanctioned bank) distributed its research to
Edward Jones, a bank not involved in the Settlement (Craig [2003]). Edward Jones has the
largest number of broker offices, a proxy for the number of individual investor clients, in the
United States among all banks (Securities Industry Association [2001]).
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3.4 CONTROL FIRMS SAMPLE
We use a matched sample of firm-events to control for other potential
factors that could affect our results. Control firms must satisfy the follow-
ing criteria: be listed on the same exchange as the Settlement firm; have
institutional ownership, I/B/E/S, and Compustat data available over the
period examined; be in the same size (total assets) quintile; be in the same
industry; and have a maximum difference in consensus recommendation
between the Settlement firm and the control firm of less than or equal to
one (the equivalent of a one-category difference, e.g., from strong buy to
buy, or from buy to hold). Size quintiles are formed by sorting all firms that
are in the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry
in the calendar quarter prior to the event period. If more than one firm
meets these criteria, we choose the control firm that is closest in the consen-
sus recommendation to the Settlement firm. If no firm meets these criteria,
we relax the industry constraint until we find a match. For the three sam-
ple firms that have more than one event period, we match each firm-event
observation independently. We control for industry and size because these
factors could affect the composition of individual and institutional investors.
For example, many of our firms operate in technology industries, and in-
stitutions could have been leaving this sector in general. The advantage of
controlling for consensus recommendation levels is that we can attribute
any relative differences to analysts’ misleading behavior rather than to an-
alysts who simply have positive beliefs. This control group, however, could
contain optimism that is a result of both true beliefs and strategic bias. The
more that misleading behavior explains the optimism in the control group,
the lower the power of our tests.
3.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for firm characteristics measured the
quarter before the beginning of the Settlement event period. These vari-
ables (defined in the table) are computed using Compustat and I/B/E/S
data. The variables Institutional Ownership, Number of Institutions, Institutional
Ownership/Institution, Short Interest, and Returns are used in our tests and are
discussed in the respective sections below. Panel A shows that the size of
Settlement firms is skewed, with the mean larger than the median. Growth
rates, proxied by percentage sales growth, are high and returns on assets
are negative. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the control-firm sam-
ple. Not surprisingly, given our matching process, the characteristics of the
control sample are quite similar to those of the Settlement firms. The mean
difference between Settlement and control firms for the Compustat and
I/B/E/S variables is not different based on two-tailed t-tests.
3.6 RELATION BETWEEN ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS AND RETURNS
Two conditions are necessary for a wealth transfer to exist: the investor
groups must be systematically trading in different directions and there must
be price changes following the trading that are consistent with the trading
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T A B L E 2
Descriptive Statistics on Sample Firms
This table reports descriptive statistics for our sample of 50 firm-events. Panel A(B) describes
the Settlement (control) firms. Control firms are matched with the Settlement firms based on
exchange listing, firm size, industry, and analyst consensus recommendation level. Variables
are computed as of the quarter before the Settlement event period begins for all observations
with available data. Total Assets is measured as total assets, Market Capitalization is the stock
price at the end of the fiscal year multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding,
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt plus current debt to total assets, Return on Assets is the
ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets, Growth is the percentage change
in net sales, and Book to Market is common equity divided by market value. These variables
are computed using Compustat data. Recommendation Levels is the I/B/E/S consensus analyst
recommendation level. From Thomson Financial, Institutional Ownership is the percentage
of common stock held by institutional shareholders, Number of Institutions is the number of
institutions owning the stock, and Institutional Ownership/Institution is the percentage of total
common stock held by institutional shareholders divided by the number of institutions owning
the stock. From Bloomberg and Barron’s, Short Interest is the number of shares shorted as a
percentage of total shares outstanding. From CRSP, Returns is the raw percentage returns over
the SEC event period. Significant mean differences (at the 10% two-tailed level) in variables
between the control and Settlement firms, calculated using t-tests, are indicated with an ∗ in
the mean column of panel B.
Mean Median 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Settlement firms
Total Assets 17,883 896 250 7,986
Market Capitalization 21,355 1,105 393 10,855
Leverage 0.23 0.15 0.01 0.39
Return on Assets −0.21 −0.08 −0.25 0.05
Growth 0.96 0.82 0.13 1.63
Book to Market 0.68 0.28 0.08 0.68
Recommendation Levels 1.72 1.62 1.50 1.87
Institutional Ownership 40.98 39.37 24.83 56.32
Number of Institutions 237.7 101 49 245
Institutional Ownership/Institution 0.381 0.293 0.168 0.575
Short Interest 2.17 1.57 0.61 3.43
Returns −31.81 −33.80 −60.53 −12.75
Panel B: Control firms
Total Assets 5,846 1,034 164 2,962
Market Capitalization 12,545 854 392 14,255
Leverage 0.25 0.22 0.01 0.39
Return on Assets −0.27 0.04 −0.17 0.10
Growth 0.78 0.27 0.01 0.77
Book to Market 0.39 0.26 0.14 0.46
Recommendation Levels 1.73 1.67 1.52 1.94
Institutional Ownership 35.0 36.6 7.7 55.3
Number of Institutions 141.1∗ 62 29 160
Institutional Ownership/Institution 0.473 0.311 0.162 0.793
Short Interest 2.55 1.48 0.25 3.04
Returns −2.86∗ −19.10 −36.46 −5.34
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pattern. Analogously, if analysts’ misleading behavior results in a wealth
transfer then there must be a relation between analysts and price changes.
The literature on analysts establishes that information from a single analyst
can affect market prices, and hence can influence investors.13 The literature
also shows that analyst recommendations, while having modest investment
value (as evidenced by long-term returns drifting in the direction of the ana-
lyst recommendation), do not produce large enough returns to cover trans-
action costs, consistent with an efficient market (Womack [1996], Barber
et al. [2001]).
In untabulated analysis, we examine the effect of analysts’ recommen-
dations on returns for the period after the stock market “bubble” burst
(March, 2000), which is for the period that aligns most closely with our sam-
ple event periods. As expected, the recommendation-return relation is neg-
ative for Settlement firms. In contrast, for control firms long-term returns
following strong buy and buy recommendations are positive. Following the
advice of these “nonmisleading” analysts would have produced investment
gains.14 We conjecture that Settlement analysts realized that the true values
of Settlement firms were lower than the respective market prices, but failed
to update their public recommendations because of investment-banking
pressures—hence the long-window negative returns. In support of this idea,
additional untabulated analysis indicates that for Settlement firms, analysts
at sanctioned banks were slower than other analysts to update their recom-
mendations during the nine-month period prior to the start of the event
period. This finding is consistent with the finding of O’Brien, McNichols,
and Lin [2005] that affiliated analysts are slower to downgrade their recom-
mendations. In sum, we find evidence that analysts’ activities led to mispric-
ing of Settlement stocks, a condition necessary for an analyst-caused wealth
transfer to exist.
4. Tests of Changes in Institutional Holdings
This section presents our primary tests, which focus on the change in
institutional holdings over the event periods established by the Settlement.
13 Analyst studies show that individual analyst disclosures produce short-window abnormal
returns consistent with the direction and magnitude of the forecast, recommendation revision,
and target price (Lys and Sohn [1990], Abarbanell [1991], Womack [1996], Francis and Soffer
[1997], Brav and Lehavy [2003], Asquith, Mikhail, and Au [2005]).
14 The untabulated analysis includes the following. For both Settlement and control firms,
using all I/B/E/S analyst recommendations on these firms for the period October 1993 until
December 2002, we calculate cumulative value-weighted market-adjusted returns for the five-
day window centered on the recommendation date and daily long-term abnormal returns
following the recommendation using a four-factor model (Barber et al. [2006]). In addition to
the postbubble results, we also calculate prebubble results and show that there is little difference
in the recommendation-return relation between Settlement and control firms, consistent with
the literature (e.g., Barber et al. [2001]).
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We expect institutional ownership to decline for our Settlement sample
during these periods.
4.1 DATA AND METHOD
We obtain institutional holdings from Thomson Financial, which gathers
this information from SEC institutional 13F filings. Institutions with more
than $100 million in equity holdings must report their equity ownership
to the SEC quarterly via 13F filings. Noninstitutional investors are those in-
vestors who do not file 13F documents with the SEC. This group includes
individuals as well as more sophisticated traders such as short sellers, man-
agement, and other firm insiders. We expect sophisticated investors to access
information sets and trade in a fashion similar to institutions. Their exclu-
sion from the institutional holdings measures weakens the power of our
tests.
Our principal measure of institutional holdings is the total ownership of
all institutions as a percentage of a firm’s total common shares outstanding
(Institutional Ownership). We also decompose this measure into the number
of institutions holding the stock (Number of Institutions) and the average per-
centage holdings per institution (Institutional Ownership/Institution). Table 2
presents descriptive statistics on the levels of these variables, measured be-
fore the event period. Institutional ownership relative to shares outstanding
and per institution is similar across the Settlement and control groups. We
examine the change of each measure over time and report t-statistics that
test whether the change differs from zero. We compute p-values using a
bootstrap method (e.g., Yatchew [2003]).15
We use two types of event windows. The first approach, the “variable-
length” window, matches the event window as closely as possible to the event
period defined by the Settlement. This matching process is somewhat coarse
because Settlement event periods tend to neither begin nor end on a cal-
endar quarter basis. The start (end) of the variable-length event period is
the last (first) calendar quarter end before (after) the first (last) day of
the event period as specifically defined in the Settlement. Hence, variable-
length event windows are always longer than those listed in the Settlement.
The second approach assumes common “fixed-length” event windows. The
15 Given the small number of observations in our sample, the test based on the bootstrap
method is more reliable than the parametric t-statistic. Results and inferences, however, are not
affected if we use the p-values based on parametric tests. Each bootstrap p-value is computed
using simulations (randomly drawing data with replacement) to construct the empirical distri-
bution of the t-statistic, which is asymptotically standard normal. First, using the original sample
(i.e., n = 50 observations) we compute the residuals ε = y – mean(y). T is the t-statistic for this
original sample (mean(y) ∗ n1/2/standard deviation(ε)). We then take 20,000 repeated samples
out of the residual pool. For each sample B = 1 . . . 20,000, we obtain the bootstrap data ε i (B),
i = 1 . . . n and compute the t-statistic (B) = n1/2 ∗ mean(ε i(B))/standard deviation(ε i(B)).
Statistical significance (two-sided test H0: sample mean = 0) is computed as: p-value = min-
imum(N 1/20,000; N 2/20,000) where N 1 = number of times that t-statistic (B) ≥ T and
N 2 = number of times that t-statistic (B) ≤ T .
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start of the event window is still the last calendar quarter ending before the
first day of the Settlement period; however, the end is fixed at one, two, and
three calendar quarters from the first day. The advantage is that we do not
rely on the ending date of the Settlement, which is somewhat arbitrary. For
example, 25 of the 58 firm-event periods listed in the Settlement are exactly
90 or 91 days long. It is possible that the differential-trading behavior of
individuals and institutions ends prior to, or after, the Settlement-defined
event period end date.
4.2 RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results of our analysis of changes in institutional
holdings. Each panel presents the results of the same tests but for different
event windows. Column 1 of panel A shows that institutional holdings for
the Settlement firms decrease by 4.8% over the variable-length event pe-
riod, consistent with our predictions. The average number of institutional
investors also decreases by 21. The changes for these two variables are statisti-
cally significant. We find no evidence that ownership per institution changes.
Column 2 of panel A shows that for control firms, none of the three mea-
sures suggest that institutional holdings change over the Settlement period.
The third column shows that the matched-pair difference between the Set-
tlement and control firms produces similar results to those of column 1.
Panels B to D present results using fixed-length event windows. Although
there is no evidence of changes in institutional ownership in the one-
quarter window, there is evidence of decreases in institutional holdings in
the two- and three-quarter windows, which reinforces the results from our
variable-length event-window analysis in panel A. Our lack of results for the
one-quarter window is consistent with a lack of power to detect the changing
trend. Recall that our mapping from the period specifically defined in the
Settlement to the empirical window is imprecise and that only part of the
Settlement period overlaps with the one-quarter event window. The institu-
tional investor change results for the control sample, and for the difference
between the Settlement and control samples for the fixed-length event win-
dows, are consistent with the variable-length event-window analysis.
In summary, the evidence is consistent with our predicted effect of mis-
leading behavior by analysts. The decrease in institutional ownership over
the Settlement event period is mainly attributable to decreases in the num-
ber of institutions holding the stock rather than to decreases in the owner-
ship per institution. This suggests that analysts disclosed their private infor-
mation only to select institutions. These findings are less consistent with the
idea that institutions mechanically sold for nonanalyst reasons, in which case
we would have expected a more broad-based reaction by all institutions.
5. Tests of Detailed Large- and Small-Size Trading
In this section, we present additional analysis of the behavior of insti-
tutions and individuals using detailed trade and quote information from
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T A B L E 3
Changes in Institutional Ownership
This table presents an analysis of changes in Settlement and control firms’ institutional owner-
ship over the event period defined by the Settlement. Panel A computes the mean change from
the last calendar quarter before the first day of the event period to the first calendar quarter
after the last day of the event period. Panels B, C, and D compute the mean change from the
last calendar quarter before the first day of the event period to the first, second, and third
calendar quarter from the start of the event period. Settlement refers to the Settlement firms
and Control refers to the matched-control sample. The sample consists of 50 firm-event observa-
tions for each group. Institutional Ownership is the change in the percentage of total common
stock held by institutional shareholders, Number of Institutions is the change in the number
of institutions owning the stock, and Institutional Ownership/Institution is the change in the
percentage of total common stock held by institutional shareholders divided by the number
of institutions owning the stock. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance
is based on bootstrapped p-values. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
(two-tailed) levels, respectively.
Settlement Control (Settlement – Control)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Variable-length event window
Institutional Ownership −4.79 1.49 −6.28
(−2.08)∗∗ (1.24) (−2.62)∗∗∗
Number of Institutions −21.24 2.06 −23.30
(−2.59)∗∗∗ (0.30) (−3.23)∗∗∗
Institutional Ownership/Institution −0.023 0.006 −0.03
(−1.27) (0.19) (−0.81)
Panel B: One-quarter event window
Institutional Ownership −0.05 1.34 −1.39
(−0.05) (1.33) (−0.96)
Number of Institutions −7.10 1.38 −8.48
(−1.17) (0.48) (−1.42)
Institutional Ownership/ Institution −0.001 −0.02 0.02
(−0.01) (−0.91) (0.69)
Panel C: Two-quarter event window
Institutional Ownership −4.17 2.09 −6.26
(−1.93)∗∗ (1.55)∗ (−2.69)∗∗∗
Number of Institutions −16.9 1.74 −18.62
(−2.34)∗∗ (0.39) (−2.75)∗∗∗
Institutional Ownership/Institution −0.037 0.02 0.06
(−2.77)∗∗∗ (0.71) (−1.91)∗∗
Panel D: Three-quarter event window
Institutional Ownership −5.60 0.88 −6.47
(−2.17)∗∗ (0.62) (−2.35)∗∗
Number of Institutions −31.14 −2.82 −28.32
(−3.27)∗∗∗ (−0.49) (−3.08)∗∗∗
Institutional Ownership/Institution −0.032 0.02 −0.05
(−1.83)∗ (0.43) (−1.28)
the NYSE TAQ database. Although these TAQ-based variables contain more
measurement error than institutional holdings, they provide an indepen-
dent test of whether individuals are buying more shares of the Settlement
firms, relative to institutions. In addition, these measures allow us to analyze
separately the effects of trades by larger and smaller investors.
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5.1 DATA AND METHOD
We continue to adopt both variable- and fixed-length event-window ap-
proaches. We take advantage of daily measures and let the variable-length
window start and stop on the same days as those defined in the Settlement.
The fixed-length window starts on the start day of the Settlement period.
The basic intuition underlying our trading volume measures is that individ-
uals (institutions) are more likely to trade using small- (large-)size trades.
We define our TAQ-based trading measures as follows. First, we assign all
trades into three groups based on the number of shares traded. The ad-
vantage of using cutoffs based on shares traded as opposed to trade dollar
values (e.g., Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick [2003]) is that these
cutoffs are independent of the stock price level, thereby improving cross-
sectional comparability. This is particularly important for our study because
the sample firms demonstrate wide variation in stock prices. Trades of less
than 1,000 shares are considered small and trades greater than 10,000 shares
are considered large. Consistent with the literature, we exclude trades be-
tween these two cutoffs because these trades are more difficult to attribute
to individuals or institutions. Lee and Radhakrishna [2000] show that elim-
inating medium-size trades increases the ability of the measures to identify
individual from institutional trading.
Second, we use the Lee and Ready [1991] algorithm to classify trades as
buyer initiated or seller initiated.16 We define a net buying (NetBuy) measure
as the difference between buyer- and seller-initiated trades. Our measures
of small and large net buying are defined as follows:
Small NetBuyit =
Small Buyit − Small Sell it




Large Buyit − Large Sell it
Small Buyit + Small Sell it + Large Buyit + Large Sell it
, (2)
where Small (Large) Buyit is the total number of firm-i buyer-initiated shares
traded on day t classified as small- (large-)size trades, and Small (Large) Sellit
is the total number of firm-i seller-initiated shares traded on day t classified
as small- (large-)size trades. We define a third measure as the difference
between (1) and (2) to summarize how individuals’ trading behavior differs
from that of institutions:
NetBuy Differenceit =
(Small Buyit − Small Sell it) − (Large Buyit − Large Sell it)
Small Buyit + Small Sell it + Large Buyit + Large Sell it
.
(3)
As an additional benchmark, we estimate the net buying measures for
individuals and institutions for the control firms and report differences
16 Studies that validate this algorithm include Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara [2000] and
Odders-White [2000].
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between the two samples. We present t-statistics using bootstrapped (two-
tailed) p-values.
These TAQ-based variables suffer from measurement error and bias. First,
our cutoffs are coarse. To the extent that our cutoffs fail to identify the type
of investor and there is no systematic pattern in the measurement error,
the power of our tests is reduced. As an example, brokers could aggregate
individual trades into a large-block order, causing measurement error; but
we do not expect that this practice occurs systematically in one direction,
thereby introducing bias. Second, building on the theoretical intuition that
investors with private information will likely trade gradually over time in
order to profit before their trades fully reveal the information (e.g., Kyle
[1985], Admati and Pfleiderer [1988]), Barclay and Warner [1993] and
Chakravarty [2001] find that institutions are responsible for informed trad-
ing and this trading is concentrated in the medium-size category. In the
context of this study, institutions would likely mask their informed selling by
breaking sell orders into smaller lots. Thus, the probability of having a large
sell order is smaller than the probability of having a large buy order (e.g.,
Harris [2003]). As a result, some sell orders of institutions are more likely
to be misclassified in the middle- and small-size trade categories. Therefore,
the Large NetBuy measure is positively biased while the Small NetBuy measure
is negatively biased (i.e., true institutional and individual net buying is more
negative and positive, respectively), which works against us.
We also investigate, but do not report, a number of alternative algorithms
to determine whether the trade was seller or buyer initiated and whether an
individual or an institution placed the order. First, we run our tests using the
Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara [2000] algorithm to distinguish between buyer-
and seller-initiated trades. Their algorithm better classifies trades between
the quotes than Lee and Ready [1991]. Second, we employ a large number
of different cutoffs that have been used by extant literature. These cutoffs
can be classified into three groups: (1) number of shares traded, (2) value
of shares traded, and (3) a combination of both number and value of shares
traded.17 In general, the results from these alternative cutoffs are similar to
those that we report.
5.2 RESULTS
Table 4 presents the results of using the TAQ-based variables to measure
the trading behavior of individuals and institutions over the variable-length
17 See, for example, Bhattacharya [2001], Lee and Radhakrishna [2000], Barclay,
Hendershott, and McCormick [2003], Bhattacharya et al. [2004], Mikhail, Walther, and
Willis [2005], and Malmendier and Shanthikumar [2004, 2005]. The actual trade-size cut-
offs to estimate individual/institutional trading that we investigate, which take the form of
(less than/more than) are as follows: (500 shares/1,000 shares), (500 shares/10,000 shares),
($7,000/$30,000), ($5,000/$35,000), ($10,000/$10,000), ($10,000 and 800 shares/$30,000),
($7,000 and 500 shares/$30,000), and ($5,000 and 500 shares/$30,000).
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T A B L E 4
TAQ-Based Analysis of Trading over Variable-Length Event Window
This table presents an analysis of trading by small-size and large-size traders over the event
period defined by the Settlement. Small NetBuy is the difference between daily volumes of
small-size buy- and sell-initiated trades scaled by the total number of shares traded by small and
large traders that day. Large NetBuy is the difference between daily volumes of large-size buy-
and sell-initiated trades scaled by the total number of shares traded by small and large traders
that day. NetBuy Difference is Small NetBuy less Large NetBuy. N is the number of observations.
Panel A presents mean measures based on daily pooled observations. Panel B presents mean
results based on one observation (time-series average) per firm event. Settlement refers to the
Settlement firms and Control refers to the matched-control sample. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. In panel B, statistical significance is based on bootstrapped p-values. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-tailed) levels, respectively.
Settlement Control (Settlement – Control)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Daily observations
Small NetBuy 0.013 −0.008 0.021
(5.87)∗∗∗ (−2.10)∗∗ (4.84)∗∗∗
Large NetBuy −0.004 −0.005 0.002
(−1.26) (−1.72)∗ (0.35)
NetBuy Difference 0.017 −0.003 0.020
(4.43)∗∗∗ (−0.54) (3.15)∗∗∗
N 4,606 4,600 4,600
Panel B: Firm-event observations
Small NetBuy 0.019 −0.017 0.036
(2.72)∗∗ (−1.64)∗ (2.92)∗∗∗
Large NetBuy −0.014 −0.011 −0.003
(−1.28) (−1.45) (−0.24)
NetBuy Difference 0.033 −0.007 0.040
(3.13)∗∗∗ (−0.56) (2.45)∗∗
N 50 50 50
event window. Panel A presents the mean value of Small NetBuy and Large
NetBuy measures in which each trading day during the sample firms’ Settle-
ment period is one observation. The sample consists of 4,606 pooled daily
observations. Firms with longer Settlement periods have more weight in this
analysis. The first column presents results for the Settlement firms. The posi-
tive and statistically significant value of the Small NetBuy mean for Settlement
firms shows that individuals were generally buying during the event period,
consistent with individuals naively following the misleading recommenda-
tions of analysts. The mean of the Large NetBuy measure, while negative,
is not statistically significant and fails to provide evidence that institutions
were buying or selling trades during the period. The difference between
these two measures is significantly different from zero, consistent with our
expectations. The second column shows the results of the same tests for the
control sample. There is some evidence that both individuals and institu-
tions for these firms were generally selling shares, although the difference
between the two is not statistically significant. The third column shows the
matched-pair difference between the Settlement and control samples. The
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T A B L E 5
TAQ-Based Analysis of Trading over Fixed-Length Event Windows
This table presents an analysis of trading by small-size and large-size traders over monthly periods relative
to the first day of the Settlement event period. Small NetBuy is the difference between daily volumes of
small-size buy- and sell-initiated trades scaled by the total number of shares traded by small and large
traders that day. Large NetBuy is the difference between daily volumes of large-size buy- and sell-initiated
trades scaled by the total number of shares traded by small and large traders that day. NetBuy Difference
is Small NetBuy less Large NetBuy. N is the number of daily firm-event observations pooled each month.
Settlement refers to the Settlement firms and Control refers to the matched-control sample. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is based on bootstrapped p-values. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote




Small Large NetBuy NetBuy NetBuy
NetBuy NetBuy Difference Difference Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-event window
3 months before starting
day (N = 1,006)
0.013 −0.002 0.014 −0.023 0.037
(2.63)∗∗∗ (−0.27) (1.88)∗ (−2.11)∗∗ (2.85)∗∗∗
2 months before starting
day (N = 1,000)
0.010 −0.007 0.018 −0.034 0.052
(2.19)∗∗ (−1.13) (2.23)∗∗ (−3.04)∗∗∗ (3.99)∗∗∗
1 month before starting
day (N = 1,033)
0.016 0.008 0.007 −0.032 0.039
(3.40)∗∗∗ (1.32) (0.96) (−2.97)∗∗∗ (2.97)∗∗∗
Event window
1 month after starting day
(N = 1,059)
0.017 −0.017 0.034 −0.014 0.048
(3.89)∗∗∗ (−2.57)∗∗ (4.26)∗∗∗ (−1.30) (3.61)∗∗∗
2 months after starting
day (N = 1,003)
0.014 −0.013 0.027 −0.018 0.038
(2.35)∗∗ (−2.07)∗∗ (2.58)∗∗∗ (−1.56) (2.85)∗∗∗
3 months after starting
day (N = 1,004)
0.013 −0.012 0.024 0.006 0.017
(3.67)∗∗∗ (−1.87)∗ (2.99)∗∗∗ (0.55) (1.26)
4 months after starting
day (N = 1,016)
0.009 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.003
(1.75)∗ (0.99) (0.30) (−0.02) (0.20)
5 months after starting
day (N = 926)
0.016 −0.003 0.019 −0.033 0.052
(3.22)∗∗∗ (−0.47) (2.36)∗∗ (−2.83)∗∗∗ (3.67)∗∗∗
6 months after starting 0.017 −0.011 0.028 −0.007 0.035
day (N = 944) (3.73)∗∗∗ (−1.61)∗ (3.42)∗∗∗ (−0.64) (2.67)∗∗∗
result shows that, relative to the control group, individuals in Settlement
firms were net buyers relative to institutions. Panel B shows the same tests
but aggregates the net buying trading measures over time per firm-event to
create one measure (the time-series mean) for each firm-event observation.
This measure weights each firm-event equally in the analysis. The results are
consistent with the inferences in panel A.
Table 5 shows the results of the analysis in which we consider fixed-length
monthly event windows starting three months before, and ending six months
after, the first day of the Settlement period (i.e., day 0) for the pooled firm-
day sample. We stop our analysis at six months because as panel B of table 1
shows, 76% of the observations have event windows that last six months or
less. Each row in table 5 shows a different month and there is no overlap
in the periods. The first, second, and third columns show the mean Small
NetBuy, Large NetBuy, and NetBuy Difference, respectively, for the Settlement
firms. For parsimony, we tabulate results only for the summary measure
NetBuy Difference for the control and Settlement-less-control samples. This
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monthly analysis produces results consistent with the variable-length window
analysis above. For all six months of the event period, Settlement firms’ Small
NetBuy is positive and statistically significant, and for five months, Settlement
firms’ NetBuy Difference is positive and significant. Here we see evidence of
institutional selling. In each of the first three months of the event period,
Settlement firms’ Large NetBuy is negative and significant. In the pre-event
period, the NetBuy Difference is also positive and statistically significant in two
of the three months, driven by the positive values of Small NetBuy, suggesting
individuals followed the positive analyst recommendations that were issued
before the event period started. In summary, the results of this TAQ analy-
sis provide additional evidence consistent with our hypothesis that analysts’
misleading behavior leads to a wealth transfer. In particular, the results sug-
gest that individuals were following the public advice of misleading analysts
while institutions were selling at the same time.
6. Economic Consequence of Differential Trading Behavior
In this section, we incorporate stock returns into our TAQ-based analysis.
We first graphically examine the trading behavior of individuals and institu-
tions as well as the stock returns over time. Then, in conjunction with various
assumptions about holding periods, we present estimated dollar profits of
individuals and institutions in order to gauge the economic magnitude of
the wealth transfer.
6.1 TIMING OF TRADES
We examine the timing of individual and institutional trading as further
evidence of a wealth transfer between the two groups. Figure 1 plots the
cumulative individual net buying, cumulative institutional net buying, and
the difference of these two for our Settlement firms starting about three
months prior to day 0 (60 trading days) and ending six months after day 0
(120 trading days), where day 0 is the first day of each firm’s event period
as defined in the Settlement. The figure also plots the cumulative abnormal
returns for the equal-weighted portfolio of sample firms. Abnormal returns
are defined as cumulative raw returns less the cumulative value-weighted
market return (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ).18
We discuss three distinct periods. In the pre-event period (day −60 to day
−1), individuals consistently buy more than they sell, while institutions on
average buy and sell in approximately equal amounts. Cumulative abnormal
returns are −11.5% during this period. In the first part of the event period
(day 0 to +60), individuals’ net buying persists even though returns decline
more rapidly (cumulative abnormal returns are −15.7%). Institutions seem
astute in the timing of their trades in Settlement stocks. They start to sell
more shares than they buy at the beginning of the event period, consistent
18 The analyses in this section are robust to using NASDAQ index-adjusted abnormal returns.
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FIG. 1.—Time-series of stock returns and individual and institutional investors’ net buying.
This figure plots the cumulative small-size trades, cumulative large-size trades, and the cumula-
tive difference of these two groups for the Settlement firms starting from three months prior to
day 0 (60 trading days) and ending six months after day 0 (120 trading days). Day 0 is the first
day of the Settlement period. Small NetBuy is the difference between daily volumes of small-size
buy and sell trades scaled by the total number of shares traded by small and large traders that
day. Large NetBuy is the difference between daily volumes of large-size buy and sell trades scaled
by the total number of shares traded by small and large traders that day. NetBuy Difference is
Small NetBuy less Large NetBuy. The figure also plots the cumulative abnormal returns for the
equally weighted portfolio of Settlement firms, where abnormal returns are raw returns less
the value-weighted market return. The first labeled vertical axis refers to cumulative net buying
and the second labeled vertical axis refers to abnormal returns.
with analysts affecting institutional trading. Hence, during the first three
months of the event period, the graphical evidence suggests a wealth transfer
from institutions to individuals. This pattern appears to be driven mostly by
individual buying and in small part by institutional selling. In the second
part of the event period (day +61 to +120), individuals continue to (net)
buy the Settlement stocks. Institutions are neither net buyers nor net sellers
during this period. Returns, however, are more volatile, and hence there is
less evidence of a wealth transfer between investors.
6.2 TRADING DOLLAR PROFITS
We develop a measure that proxies for the dollar profits of individuals
and institutions based on the amount of daily net buying classified by trade
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size and the closing stock price on each day. We calculate a measure of the
economic gain (Gain) separately for small- and large-size trade groups and




(Buyt − Sell t )(PN − Pt ), (4)
where Buyt (Sellt) is the total number of buyer- (seller-)initiated shares traded
on day t that fall in the trade size category, N is the last day of the Settlement
event window, and PN and Pt is the closing stock price for the firm on date N
and day t, respectively. Our measure is consistent with each investor group
taking a trading position based on the net buys or sells, and holding this
position until the end of the event period. This trading position can be long
or short in the stock. Selling or buying with similar order size any time in the
event period has no effect on the measured economic gain over the event
period.
An alternative and equivalent interpretation of our measure is that each
investor group develops a trading position in the security, based on whether
they are net buyers or sellers each day. On day 0, the investor group starts
with a zero trading position and each day the position is adjusted up or
down based on whether the group is a net buyer or seller that day. The
dollar gains of the trading position on day t are calculated based on the
trading position on day t−1 multiplied by the change in price from day t to
day t−1. Gain represents the aggregate dollar profit on this dynamic trading
position, calculated until the event period ends.19
We define Total Gain as the sum of Gain for all firms and calculate it
separately for each investor group. This measure represents the amount
lost or gained by active traders in each investor group. For statistical tests,
we define Gain∗ as Gain scaled by the firm’s market capitalization to facilitate
comparisons across firms. We report the mean Gain∗ for each investor group
and test whether it differs from zero.
To account for the opportunity costs of investors, we also present results




(Buyit − Sell it)(PN − Pt (1 + MktRett,N)), (5)
where MktRet is the value-weighted market return. The market was quite
volatile during the event period and realized mostly negative returns, which
could affect our calculation of Gain for each investor group.
19 To illustrate our calculation, consider an event period that is four days long, a single
investor, and closing prices on day 1, 2, 3, and 4 of $5, $6, $6.50, and $7, respectively. On the
first day, the investor buys 10 shares, on the second day the investor sells eight shares, and on
the third day the investor buys three shares. Trades on the last day are ignored because t = N
on the last day so PN − Pt = 0. According to our calculation, Gain = 10 × 2 − 8 × 1 + 3 ×
0.5 = 13.50. One may also calculate the investor’s dollar profit on a daily basis based on the
investor’s daily portfolio, which would lead to an economic gain of 10 × 1 + 2 × 0.5 + 5 × 0.5 =
13.50, an equivalent amount to our calculation.
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T A B L E 6
Economic Gain for Small- and Large-Size Traders
This table presents a summary of the trading profit analysis for small-size and large-size traders over
the event period specifically defined by the Settlement. Panel A presents the results using raw returns.
The dollar profit is Gain = ∑Nt=1 (Buyt − Sell t ) (P N − P t ), where P t is the closing stock price for the
firm on date t, P N is the closing stock price for the firm at the ending date of the empirical event
window, and N is the last day of the event window. Buyt (Sell t ) is the total number of buy-initiated (sell-
initiated) shares traded on day t that fall in the trade size category consistent with the investor-group
classifications. Column 1 presents Total Gain ($million), which is the sum of Gain for all firms in the
investor category. Column 2 presents the mean of Gain∗ (in dollars), which equals each firms’ Gain
scaled by the firm’s market capitalization ($million). Column 3 presents t-statistics that test whether
mean Gain∗ differs from zero. For each event period, results are presented for small-size and large-size
traders and t-statistics for the difference between the mean Gain∗ of the two groups. Event periods
examined include the Settlement period and the first, second, and third months following the first day
of the Settlement period. Columns 4 to 6 present results using market-adjusted returns. Mkt-Adj Gain =∑N
t=1 (Buyit − Sell it ) (P N − P t (1 + MktRet t,N )) where MktRet is the value-weighted market return.
Statistical significance is based on bootstrapped p-values. ∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10% and
1% (two-tailed) levels, respectively.
Raw Returns Market-Adjusted Returns
Total Mean Total Mean
Trade Gain Gain∗ t-statistic Gain Gain∗ t-statistic
Event Window Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable-length
(N = 50)
Small −2,232 −10,173 (−3.81)∗∗∗ −2,025 −9,459 (−3.79)∗∗∗




Small −1,115 −5,653 (−3.09)∗∗∗ −1,043 −5,273 (−3.10)∗∗∗




Small −605 −2,030 (−1.95)∗ −501 −1,805 (−1.87)∗




Small −256 −1,345 (−1.74)∗ −231 −1,255 (−1.62)∗
Large −115 2,006 (1.02) −80 1,967 (1.09)
t-statistic (−1.60) (−1.64)∗
We again use two event-period approaches—variable-length and fixed-
length monthly windows. The first, second, and third month are calculated
from day 0 to day 30, day 31 to day 60, and day 61 to day 90, respectively. We
focus on these three months to be consistent with our TAQ analysis above
that shows that analysts’ misleading behavior potentially had the strongest
effect on the wealth transfer during this period. We continue to report t-
statistics using bootstrapped (two-tailed) p-values.
We expect to observe an economic loss (i.e., negative values of Gain) for
both institutions and individuals as the majority of our Settlement firms
experience a decrease in their stock price over the event period. The em-
phasis, however, is on whether actively trading individuals lose more than
actively trading institutions. Table 6 reports a summary of the trading-profit
analysis for both small- and large-size trade groups. We first discuss the raw
return analysis (columns 1–3). The first three rows present the results for
the variable-length event window. Total Gain is negative for both groups,
although investors with small-size trades lose more money. The total loss for
small-size traders over the event period is estimated to be $2.2 billion, while
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the loss for large-size traders is only $845 million. This result is not sim-
ply due to small-size traders trading more than large-size-traders, because
untabulated analysis indicates that large-size traders on average trade more
than small-size traders. The mean Gain∗ by small-size traders is negative and
significantly different from zero. Regardless of how the event window is de-
fined, we note that mean Gain∗ for small-size traders (large-size-traders) is
always negative (positive). More importantly, the mean loss by small-size-
traders is significantly greater in magnitude than for large-size traders and
the results are robust to controls for market-wide stock movements (columns
4–6). Overall, the results in this section provide more direct support that
small-size traders suffer greater losses than large-size traders and that the
wealth transfer is driven by individual trading.
7. Short-Interest Analysis
In this section, we examine changes in Settlement firms’ short interest
and predict that it will be greater during the event period, consistent with
short-sale investors taking advantage of analysts’ misleading behavior. Short
sellers (e.g., hedge funds) represent sophisticated investors who do not file
13Fs (unless they hold large stock portfolios). Hedge funds for the most part
“view analysts as a waste of time” (Davis 2004b), which supports the idea that
these sophisticated investors can independently determine the true value
of the stock. Hedge funds, however, can have strong relations with sell-side
analysts since they vote along with mutual and pension fund institutions
to determine which analysts are placed on the Institutional Investor All-Star
Team (Dini [2002]). Analysts have strong incentives to cater to hedge funds
because they represent the most active traders and, more importantly, the
most lucrative trading clients (Davis [2004a, 2004b]). This suggests that if
analysts had negative opinions of a stock then they would privately inform
a hedge-fund client. There is also no reason why other types of short sellers
cannot talk to sell-side analysts. In either case, we predict that short interest
will increase.
7.1 DATA METHOD
We collect data on the number of shares sold short for both our Settle-
ment and control firms from Bloomberg and Barron’s. These data are issued
on a monthly basis by NYSE and NASDAQ. We find data for 39 Settlement
and 31 control firm-events. The missing data are not surprising given the
difficulty of obtaining short-sales data for the substantial number of firms in
our sample that trade over-the-counter. Consistent with the literature (e.g.,
Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter [2005]), we define each firm’s Short Interest as
shares sold short, divided by the total number of common shares outstand-
ing. We develop a quarterly measure per firm by taking the mean of the
three respective monthly measures. Our analysis focuses on changes in Set-
tlement and control firms’ quarterly Short Interest (Short Interest). Table 2
reports descriptive statistics for the level of Short Interest for the Settlement
and control firms measured in the quarter prior to the beginning of the
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Short Interest Analysis
This table presents an analysis of changes in Settlement and control firms’ short interest over
the event period specifically defined by the Settlement. The first row computes the mean
change from the last calendar quarter before the first day of the event period to the first
calendar quarter after the last day of the event period. The following rows compute the change
from the last calendar quarter before the first day of the event period to the first, second,
and third calendar quarter, respectively, after the start of the event period. Settlement refers to
the Settlement firms and Control refers to the matched-control sample. The sample consists
of 39 firm-event observations for the Settlement group and 31 firm-event observations for the
control group. Each firm’s quarterly Short Interest is computed as the mean of the three monthly
measures of the firm’s shares sold short scaled by the total number of shares outstanding. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is based on bootstrapped p-values.
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 5% and 1% (two-tailed) levels, respectively.
Settlement Control (Settlement – Control)
Event Window (1) (2) (3)
Variable-length 0.0172 0.0005 0.0149
(3.05)∗∗∗ (0.14) (2.49)∗∗
One-quarter 0.0164 0.0018 0.0125
(3.06)∗∗∗ (0.55) (2.37)∗∗
Two-quarter 0.0225 0.0054 0.0167
(2.89)∗∗∗ (1.25) (2.33)∗∗
Three-quarter 0.0246 0.0044 0.0227
(3.40)∗∗∗ (0.98) (3.34)∗∗∗
N 39 31 31
Settlement event period. The difference in levels between the two samples
is not statistically significant.
7.2 RESULTS
Table 7 shows that Short Interest for the Settlement firms increased dur-
ing the event period, regardless of event period definition, and that these
changes are statistically significant. In contrast, we do not find any signif-
icant changes for our control firms. Over the variable-length window, the
mean percentage of shares sold short for the Settlement firms increases by
1.72% of shares outstanding, while there is no evidence of any change for
control firms. All differences between Settlement and control firms are sta-
tistically significant. Thus, our results are robust to controlling for exchange
listing, size, industry, and consensus recommendation levels. These results
support our previous conclusions by showing that sophisticated investors,
more broadly defined than just institutions, traded in the “right direction.”
Also, because these short sellers do not typically file 13Fs, our institutional-
ownership tests (which are based on 13F holding changes) will understate
the negative effect of analysts’ misleading behavior on individuals.20
20 It is possible that short selling costs are higher for control firms than for Settlement firms.
However, the fact that we compare differences relative to the quarter prior to the event period
mitigates this concern.
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8. Additional Analysis of the Mechanism by Which Analysts’
Behavior Transferred Wealth
Our objective in this section is to tighten the link between analysts’
misleading behavior and the wealth transfer from individuals to institu-
tions. We investigate the extent to which our full-sample results hold af-
ter conditioning on select control variables, either via regression or sample
partitions.
8.1 REGRESSION ANALYSIS INCORPORATING RETURNS AND SHORT SALES
As with any univariate analysis, there could be potential factors affect-
ing investor net buying that we do not measure. To the extent that these
factors affect both the Settlement and control firms, we can rely on the dif-
ference between the two groups as a means to test our prediction. Returns
for the Settlement firms, however, are more negative than those for the con-
trol group (see table 2) and the literature shows that institutional-investor
trading behavior is correlated positively with returns. It is also possible that
institutional-investor changes are a result of institutions simply following
short sellers.
To investigate these alternative explanations, using the pooled sample
of Settlement and control firms, we regress changes in our institutional-
holding measures on a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a
Settlement firm, as well as on pre-event returns, event returns, and changes
in short sales. Our regression is:
 Institutional Ownership = β0 + β1Settlement Firm + β2Current Period Returns
+ β3Pre -Event Returns + β4Short Interest + ε.
(6)
Institutional Ownership and Short Interest are calculated in the same man-
ner and using the same fixed-length calendar windows. Settlement Firm is an
indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is in the Settlement
group and zero otherwise. Current Period Returns are abnormal returns (raw
returns adjusted by the value-weighted index) cumulated over the same cal-
endar quarters used to calculate Institutional Ownership. Pre-Event Returns
are abnormal returns cumulated over the calendar quarter just prior to the
start of the event period. Statistical significance is based on p-values calcu-
lated using a bootstrap method.
Table 8, panel A shows that the event and pre-event return coefficients
are positive and statistically significant, consistent with the findings in
the literature. We do not generally find a statistically significant coeffi-
cient on the change in short sales.21 More importantly, we find that the
21 This result holds in a regression excluding returns. Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter [2005]
document a positive relation between short sales and institutional holding changes in a large-
sample analysis, consistent with institutional ownership proxying for the “supply” of shares.
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coefficient on the Settlement-firm indicator variable is significantly nega-
tive in the second quarter and marginally significant in the third quarter
(10%, one tailed t-test). Hence, even after controlling for stock price per-
formance and short sales, we find that the percentage institutional own-
ership drops over the event period for the Settlement firms. In panel B,
we re-estimate equation (6) but use Number of Institutions (defined previ-
ously) as our dependent variable. The results are similar and corroborate
those in panel A.22 In summary, our institutional ownership findings in ta-
ble 3 are also robust to controls for stock price performance and changes
in short sales. These findings show that analyst behavior is linked directly to
the institutional-ownership changes and not indirectly via its effect on short
sellers.
We also investigate whether differences in other firm characteristics such
as total assets, return on assets, sales growth, and book-to-market ratio can
explain our findings by including controls for these firm characteristics in
the regression (results are not reported). As predicted, the Settlement firm
indicator variable is negative and statistically significant. None of the control
variable coefficients are statistically significant. Overall, these results indicate
that other factors cannot fully explain the institutional holdings results and
hence our conclusion that analysts’ misleading behavior affected the wealth
transfer.
8.2 PARTITION ANALYSIS
We investigate four partitions in table 9. The three panels show results
for changes in institutional investor holdings, detailed large- and small-size
trading, and trading dollar losses, respectively. The first column repeats the
respective full-sample results from tables 3, 4, and 6 above as a benchmark
while the last four columns present the results from the four partitions. We
discuss our motivation and results for each partition in turn.
First, we predict that those allegations where analysts selectively disclosed
their negative views to one or more investors (Disclosed Selectively) are more
strongly associated with the differential trading behavior. In the other allega-
tions, we simply conjecture that institutions received some form of a negative
signal from the analyst. The results are much stronger in this partition. For
example, the mean Institutional Ownership for the variable-length window
is −10.70, compared to the full-sample mean of −4.79. The comparative
results for Number of Institutions and for fixed-length windows are simi-
lar. This finding is consistent with the idea that institutions condition their
22 In untabulated analyses, we also conduct a similar regression of TAQ-based trading mea-
sures on returns. Concurrent returns is a significant and positive predictor of Small NetBuy and
Large NetBuy but does not predict NetBuy Difference consistent with returns affecting small- and
large-size traders about the same. The economic magnitude of the coefficient on the event-
period indicator variable and statistical significance remains similar to the corresponding TAQ
analysis, and hence all inferences are similar.
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T A B L E 9
Tests on Selected Subsamples of Observations
This table presents results for selected partitions of Settlement firms. The first column repeats
the respective full-sample results from tables 3, 4, and 6 above as a benchmark. The last four
columns present the results from four partitions: (1) Firm-events in which the SEC documents
that analysts selectively disclosed their negative news to select investors (Disclosed Selectively); (2)
Firm-events in which analysts were employed by sanctioned banks with larger-than-the-median
number of the broker offices (Banks with Larger Retail); (3) Firm-events with smaller-than-the-
median number of unique analysts issuing a recommendation (Lower Analyst Coverage); and (4)
Firm-events with larger-than-the-median market capitalization (Larger Firms). Panel A presents
the results of changes in institutional investor holdings, panel B presents the results of detailed
large- and small-size trading measures, and panel C presents the results of the trading dollar
losses. Institutional Ownership is the change in the percentage of total common stock held
by institutions, Number of Institutions is the change in the number of institutions owning the
stock. Small NetBuy is the difference between daily volumes of small-size buy- and sell-initiated
trades scaled by the total number of shares traded by small and large traders that day. Large
NetBuy is the difference between daily volumes of large-size buy- and sell-initiated trades scaled
by the total number of shares traded by small and large traders that day. NetBuy Difference is
Small NetBuy less Large NetBuy. The dollar profit is Gain = ∑t=1N (Buyit − Sell it ) (P N − P t (1 +
MktRet t,N )), where Buyt (Sell t ) is the total number of buy-initiated (sell-initiated) shares traded
on day t that fall in the trade size category consistent with the investor group classifications,
P t is the closing stock price for the firm on date t, P N is the closing stock price for the firm at
the ending date of the empirical event window, MktRet is the value-weighted market returns,
and N is the last day of the event window. Gain∗ equals each firm’s Gain scaled by the firm’s
market capitalization. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is based on
bootstrapped p-values. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-tailed)
levels, respectively.
Full Banks with Lower
Sample Disclosed Larger Analyst Larger
(Benchmark) Selectively Retail Coverage Firms




−4.79 −10.70 −5.55 −8.20 −9.16
(−2.08)∗∗ (2.79)∗∗ (2.07)∗∗ (2.26)∗∗ (2.47)∗∗
Number of
Institutions
−21.24 −30.00 −24.57 −30.22 −41.32




−0.05 −1.51 −1.73 −0.33 −1.31
(−0.05) (0.89) (1.32) (0.19) (0.69)
Number of
Institutions
−7.10 −3.50 −8.21 −11.37 −11.76




−4.17 −10.52 −5.52 −8.20 −8.12
(−1.93)∗∗ (2.39)∗∗ (2.20)∗∗ (2.60)∗∗ (2.38)∗∗
Number of
Institutions
−16.9 −25.19 −25.25 −21.93 −31.44




−5.60 −12.29 −8.02 −8.07 −12.21
(−2.17)∗∗ (2.59)∗∗ (2.61)∗∗ (2.14)∗∗ (3.00)∗∗∗
Number of
Institutions
−31.14 −46.69 −43.86 −30.67 −58.64
(−3.27)∗∗∗ (2.21)∗∗ (3.28)∗∗∗ (2.78)∗∗∗ (3.68)∗∗∗
N 50 16 28 27 25
(Continued)
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T A B L E 9 — Continued
Full Banks with Lower
Sample Disclosed Larger Analyst Larger
(Benchmark) Selectively Retail Coverage Firms
Panel B: TAQ-based analysis of trading over variable-length event window
Small NetBuy 0.013 0.024 0.026 0.005 0.025
(5.87)∗∗∗ (5.33)∗∗∗ (8.23)∗∗∗ (1.58)∗ (13.44)∗∗∗
Large NetBuy −0.004 0.008 −0.019 −0.001 −0.005
(−1.26) (1.44) (−4.25)∗∗∗ (−0.36) (−1.14)
NetBuy Difference 0.017 0.016 0.045 0.007 0.029
(4.43)∗∗∗ (2.30)∗∗ (8.18)∗∗∗ (1.26) (6.59)∗∗∗
N 4,606 1,158 2,042 2,859 2,187
Panel C: Economic gain using market-adjusted returns (mean Gain∗)
Small Traders −9,459 −13,177 −8,890 −11,674 −13,181
(−3.79)∗∗∗ (−2.66)∗∗ (−3.22)∗∗∗ (−3.08)∗∗∗ (−3.15)∗∗∗
Large Traders 1,012 −4,615 1,258 41.60 −2,250
(0.35) (−0.65) (0.55) (0.01) (−0.47)
Difference −10,471 −8,563 −10,149 −11,716 −10,931
(−3.22)∗∗∗ (−1.54) (−3.05)∗∗∗ (−2.40)∗∗ (−2.09)∗∗
N 50 16 28 27 25
trading on analysts’ private information and suggests that analysts caused in-
stitutions to “flee” the stocks while at the same time encouraging individuals
to buy.
Second, we expect that individuals access fewer information sources
and are more likely to follow recommendations of analysts at banks in
which they are clients. If so, sanctioned banks with larger retail opera-
tions should generate a stronger wealth transfer. The third column shows
the results for those sanctioned banks with a larger-than-the-median num-
ber of broker offices (Banks with Larger Retail), a proxy for the number
of individual-investor clients. For example, Morgan Stanley has 603 of-
fices, the largest number among our sanctioned banks and is ranked #6
out of all (397) Securities Industry Association members. The results are
slightly stronger for these banks, particularly for the three-quarter event
window.
Third, assuming that investors approximately weight analysts’ information
equally, and that only the analyst of the sanctioned bank provides mislead-
ing information (while the analysts at other banks do not), we expect that
misleading analysts will produce stronger wealth-transfer effects when fewer
analysts provide stock recommendations. The fourth column shows the re-
sults for firms with a smaller-than-the-median number of unique analysts
issuing a recommendation on I/B/E/S in the nine-month period prior to
the start date (Lower Analyst Coverage). The results are stronger for firms
with lower analyst coverage. Given that institutions are likely to rely less on
recommendations than individuals, this result is consistent with analysts’
WEALTH TRANSFER EFFECTS 103
misleading behavior leading individuals astray, particularly when there are
fewer recommendations available by other analysts.
Last, we investigate firm size. On one hand, we expect weaker results
for larger firms because these firms have better information environments
and it is less likely that investors in general place substantial weight on a
single source of information, i.e., one misleading analyst. On the other
hand, it is not clear that a better information environment is helpful to
individuals, who potentially lack the access to, and ability to process, this
larger information set. A superior information environment could exacer-
bate the wealth transfer if it allows institutions to react faster to new infor-
mation than individuals. The last column shows the results by firms with
a larger-than-the-median market capitalization (Larger Firms). Larger firms
have stronger results, which suggests that individuals benefit less from the
superior information environment than institutions. This result is also im-
portant because it shows that our results are not simply driven by smaller-size
firms.23
Panel B presents the results of partitions using TAQ-based trading mea-
sures. The results for the two partitions of firms in which analysts dis-
closed selectively to institutions and in which firms are larger in size are
stronger (than the full-sample results) and corroborate those documented
in panel A. The results for the partition of banks with larger retail op-
erations are particularly strong and the results for the analyst coverage
partition are weak compared to the full-sample results. In the Gain∗ mea-
sures, presented in panel C, generally we do not find differences in the
test results between the partitioned and the full-sample results. Overall, we
find some evidence that analysts’ misleading behavior helped institutions.
Most of the evidence is consistent with the wealth transfer caused by misled
individuals.
9. Concluding Remarks
This study examines the responses of individual and institutional investors
and the economic consequences of their different trading behaviors when
analysts act strategically. We draw upon the Global Research Analyst Settlement
to identify a set of firm-events in which analysts clearly issued misleading
stock research. Our sample relies on neither affiliation nor analyst recom-
mendations to proxy for strategic behavior. While investigators chose the
sample for very specific reasons, these reasons are exogenous to our re-
search question and hence should not affect our inferences.
23 There is a potential contradiction in our results because large firms generally have higher
analyst coverage. In our sample, however, a large number of firms (one-fifth of the total) are
large in size but have lower analyst coverage, and it is these firms that provide the strongest
support for the full-sample results.
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We use this sample to demonstrate that analysts’ misleading behavior
leads to a systematic wealth transfer from individual to institutional in-
vestors. We find that for the Settlement firms, institutional holdings de-
creased over the event period while short interest increased. We provide
corroborating evidence using TAQ trade size data to proxy for institu-
tions and individuals and the Lee and Ready [1991] algorithm to classify
trades as buyer or seller initiated. We find that individuals were buying
more than selling during the event period, relative to the trading of in-
stitutions. Although institutions are involved in the bulk of the trading, we
find that actively trading individuals lose $2.2 billion, an amount approx-
imately two and a half times the amount that actively trading institutions
lose.
Our paper provides direct evidence on how analysts’ misleading behavior
harms individual investors and provides empirical support for the recent
regulatory changes regarding analyst activities. To the extent that regula-
tory changes have significantly reduced the amount of strategic behavior
by analysts, the plight of individual investors has improved. This objec-
tive is consistent with the aims of regulators and lawmakers to protect all
investors.
One caveat is that the size of the Settlement sample is small and con-
sists of technology-related firms that experienced large negative returns.
Whether analysts would issue misleading disclosures of the same degree
for firms experiencing positive returns or modest negative returns is less
clear. Furthermore, it is likely that regulators investigated the sanctioned
banks because they were visible and had “deep pockets,” thus taking ad-
vantage of potential political gains (Watts and Zimmerman [1986]). Also,
regulators likely investigated and presented the most extreme cases, so the
sample is less representative of the population. Nevertheless, we believe
our findings have broader implications. If regulators believed that the an-
alyst behavior was limited, then regulation dealing with analysts’ conflicts
of interest that applied to the entire market, such as Section 501 of the
Sarbanes Oxley Act, Rule NASD 2711 and Rule NYSE 472, would have been
unnecessary.24
24 These regulations can be found at http:/www.sarbanes-oxley.com and http://www.
sec.gov/rules/sro/34-47110.htm.
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